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Science in Law:
Reliance, Idealization
& Some Calvinist Insights

by David S. Caudill

I

offer some reflections on the place of science
in law today and on the way science is viewed in
our legal system. I particularly want to focus on the
various contemporary narratives about the proper
use and role of science, in two contexts: (1) in the
courtroom and (2) in the public policy debates in
administrative agencies that regulate so many aspects of our lives. Many lawsuits involve or are de-
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cided on the basis of scientific knowledge wherein
each side calls on scientific experts to deliver determinative science. Examples include claims against
chemical companies or pharmaceutical manufacturers for producing allegedly dangerous products
or litigation concerning workplace injuries arising
from contact with harmful substances. In governmental agencies that protect human health, as
in Environmental Protection Agency’s attempts
to control or reduce air or water pollution, or the
Food & Drug Administration’s decisions about
which foods and drugs are safe, there is, on the one
hand, a profound reliance on science to make decisions but, on the other hand, debate about what to
do if the science is uncertain or which scientific
studies to believe or whether the scientific decisions have become infected by politics.
In both the courtroom and the rule-making
activities of governmental agencies, our common
sense would tell us that we should let science decide
whether a workplace chemical caused the plaintiff’s cancer or whether genetically-modified food
is dangerous or what level of mercury in water is
safe for drinking. But if we look closely at the lawsuits involving scientific issues or at the debates
surrounding agency regulations, we find scientific
controversy, contradictory scientific testimony,
and high levels of scientific uncertainty.
What is our reaction to that state of affairs?
Does it make us doubt the utility of science? Or
does our trust in science remain firm and lead us to
doubt the ability of the legal and political systems
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to get things right? Those are the questions I want
to address because a great deal is going on right
now—from climate change to food regulation to
concerns about the safety of plastic water bottles—
that should cause us to reflect on science, including
both its potential to guide lawmakers and its limitations as a source of stable knowledge.
Part of that reflection on science involves the
so-called “science wars.” Those wars were preceded by the so-called “culture wars,” the name given
to the debates between modernists and postmodernists in the humanities. On the one side were the
children of the Enlightenment, who believed in
the capacity of human reason to overcome religion
and other outdated traditions and to give us secure
knowledge. On the other side were postmodernists, who claimed to end all totalizing narratives
and who reduced knowledge to power. However,
there is a softer version of postmodernism that is
not as relativistic and is quite close to the Christian
critique of rationalistic modernism. This softer
version is one that
recognizes the tradition-bound nature of all
thinking, [that] understands [why] a purely objective and totally accurate expression of reality is
impossible, that [does not ignore] the realities of
power and coercion [and] that [recognizes that] all
concepts have a history, and that all truths need
to be put into their social and cultural context so
as to understand their scope and claims more accurately…. 1

Even though the term postmodern is sometimes used
pejoratively in Christian circles, I like the foregoing description of soft postmodernism; I also notice
the rhetorical move, where the author describes the
extremes of Enlightenment rationalism and postmodern nihilistic relativism and then constructs a
Christian view as a mediating or middle position, a
third way, which avoids the extremes.
In the science wars that followed in the wake
of the culture wars, the effort to avoid extremes
is also apparent. On the one side are those who
believe in the superiority of scientific knowledge
to provide stable truths that transcend culture
and history. On the other side are those historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science who
emphasize that the scientific enterprise is human,
2
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who identify the social and institutional aspects of
scientific communities, and who highlight the interests at work in allegedly disinterested science. In
the most extreme version of the latter perspective,
science is represented as a social construction, as
just another cultural narrative without any unique
claim to objective truth about reality. In its softer
version, which is less relativistic and quite close
to the Christian critique of scientism, it recognizes that science is not value-free and that there
are genuine scientific disputes that destabilize any
pretense that science is a machine-like producer of
uncontroversial facts.
The science wars, a 1980s’ phenomenon, are
obviously not a new topic or an earth-shaking
revelation for Christian scholars. There is a rich
and substantial history of neo-Calvinist reflection
on the natural sciences, as well as a centuries-old
conversation about conflicts between science and
religion, about whether science replaced religion or
whether science is a religion, and so forth. Calvin
himself occupies an interesting position by having
lived during the scientific revolution. I recognize
that the period identified as the scientific revolution, beginning with Copernicus, who lived from
1473-1542, and ending with Newton, who lived between 1624-1727, is a purely modernist construction. I agree with Steven Shapin that this period is
not uniquely revolutionary2 —it is just a convenient
marker with no more significance than the debate
over when the medieval “period” ends and the
modern “era” begins. But it is convenient for my
purposes that Calvin was born when Copernicus
was 36 years old, that Galileo was born the year
Calvin died, and so forth. It is not clear whether Calvin knew of Copernicus, and even though
Calvin accepted the faulty Ptolemaic system that
almost everyone else accepted, we do not think
that Calvin was against astronomical investigation
or against scientific inquiry.3 Calvin does say that
we do not get astronomy from the Scriptures, but
Calvin does not degrade science—he simply warns
that too much study of the creation might lead
one to forget the Creator and might even lead one
to think the universe was its own creator.4 That
warning is quite prophetic; Steven Weinburg, the
great physicist who is now not quite as great as a
public intellectual, wrote in 2001 that

One of the great achievements of science has
been, if not to make it impossible for intelligent
people to be religious, then at least to make it possible for them not to be religious. We should not
retreat from this accomplishment.5

I’ll return to Weinberg below because he is exemplary, both (1) with respect to his position in the
science wars, as a worshiper of science, and (2)
with respect to my argument that the science wars
are very important nowadays in law and politics;
indeed, the science wars are now firmly located

There is a rich and
substantial history of
neo‑Calvinist reflection
on the natural sciences,
as well as a centuriesold conversation about
conflicts between science
and religion, about whether
science replaced religion
or whether science is a
religion, and so forth.
within the beltway, in Washington, and were anticipated by Abraham Kuyper.
Over a hundred years ago, Kuyper dedicated
the fourth of his Stone Lectures at Princeton to
the nexus between Calvinism and science.6 Even
though we need to be very careful to recognize
Kuyper’s own background and historical context,
that is, to recognize the particular views of science
against which he was arguing, the lecture is nevertheless a sophisticated anticipation of the science
wars to come.
Kuyper makes four points, four observations,
about Calvinism and science—and even though
neo-Calvinists use the word “science” broadly to
include academic inquiry in all the disciplines, in-

cluding philosophy and history and even theology,
note that Kuyper’s examples of science are almost
all from the exact or natural sciences. He first says
that Calvinism fosters a “love for science,” and
he mentions that the microscope, the telescope,
and the thermometer were Dutch inventions.7
Calvinists believe in law and order in the cosmos,
which belief offers a foundation for empirical inquiry.8 Second, Calvinists do not place science below
spirituality, as we have no contempt for the world,
and he mentions the sixteenth-century plague in
Geneva when prayer was accompanied by hygienic
measures.9 This is where Kuyper mentions common grace and the ability of non-believers to excel
in scientific inquiry.10 Third, Kuyper notes that
scientific inquiry should be free from church, and
state, interference.11 And fourth, Kuyper sees no
conflict between faith and science.12 This is where
Kuyper, anticipating the science wars, mentions
that all science begins with faith—faith in our selfconsciousness, in our senses, in our intellect, in universal laws, and so forth.13 This begins to sound
like a critique of scientism, but as Jaap Klapwijk
points out,14 Kuyper was quite “scientistic” about
the exact sciences—observation for Kuyper did
not depend on the subjectivity of the researcher; as
a result, Kuyper does not give us much of a critique
of the physical sciences.
Later on, Dooyeweerd was more likely to challenge the myth of neutrality in the natural sciences,
and he anticipated, much more than Kuyper did,
the personal and creative aspects of scientific inquiry. Even before Polanyi’s “framework of commitment,” Habermas’s explication of human interests, Radnitzky’s theory of steering fields, and
Kuhn’s paradigm theory, Dooyeweerd offered
many neo-Calvinists a basis for investigating the
subjective and cultural aspects of the exact sciences,15 and they did investigate those aspects. From
the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, the conferences
and journal of the American Scientific Affiliation
included a lively discussion of Christian perspectives on science;16 and by the time I arrived at the
Free University in 1975, the history and philosophy of science were major fields of inquiry and controversy. By 1979, with the publication of Bruno
Latour’s and Steve Woolgar’s Laboratory Life,17 the
sociology of science engendered the so-called sciPro Rege—March 2011
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ence wars with a research program into the social,
institutional, and rhetorical aspects of the scientific
enterprise. The sociology of scientific knowledge
was a reaction against the idealized view of the scientific enterprise, which described science solely in
terms of theory, data-collection, conclusion, publication, and application or refutation.18 As to ambition, persuasion, funding bias, or cultural values,
those were not (in the idealized view) part of science; as to personal values, perception, consensus,
or institutional gatekeeping, those were good for
science but also not part of science itself. In contrast, the sociologists of science revealed the pragmatic nature of science, demonstrating that science
was not merely influenced by but consisted of values,
paradigms, cognitive and instrumental constraints,
language and metaphors, consensus-building techniques, reputation, and variable conventions. If we
view that assessment as an unfair challenge to the
superiority of scientific knowledge, we are on one
side of the science wars; and if we are comfortable
with that assessment as a realistic account, we are
on the other. Of course, this is old news—there’s
a great deal of literature from the 1980s and 1990s
describing, clarifying, and taking controversial positions in the science wars. So why am I talking
about this?
Well, to my surprise, the science wars have arrived in law. Because of the need for judges and
juries and governmental administrators to rely on
science, the nature and reliability of the scientific
enterprise have become important topics in legal
discourse. Now to be fair, the legal system’s reliance on science is not new—we have had scientific
experts in our courtrooms since the early nineteenth century,19 and we have also tried to regulate toxic substances and pharmaceuticals and even
food for centuries. But a couple of high-profile
events in recent years have heated up the controversy over the use of science in law.
First of all, there was a series of three U.S.
Supreme Court opinions in the mid- to late- 1990s
that together establish a new vision of science in
the courtroom.20 Because each side in a lawsuit
hires its own expert to testify, there had been concerns for decades about junk science in the courtroom and about experts who become advocates
for their clients, so the U.S. Supreme Court set up
4
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some new rules to ensure the reliability of scientific testimony. I think it’s fair to say that those
new guidelines, and the immense, recent scholarly
commentary concerning expertise in law, reflect a
rather idealized or romanticized vision of the scientific enterprise.21 Whereas law is represented as a
field of controversy, argument, advocacy, and rhetoric, science is represented as completely different.
Science seemingly involves stable knowledge, without bias or interest or motivation. Consequently,
when two experts disagree, it is often assumed
that one of them is a liar, a junk scientist, while the
other is telling the truth. In this new view of science, there is not a lot of room for talking about scientific controversy, argument, rhetoric, consensusbuilding, or advocacy for one’s preferred scientific
theory. Indeed, if an expert concedes the limitations of his knowledge, or admits that scientists are
influenced by the communities or institutions in
which they work, that expert is often condemned
as not delivering determinative knowledge, which
is what science is supposed to offer to the indeterminate
and argumentative field of law.22 And there is even a
trend to blame lawyers for the shortage of scientific truth in the courtroom. Some have suggested
that lawyers have an ethical responsibility to ensure the accuracy of their experts because anyone
can supposedly do a little research and figure out
the scientific truth in a particular field.23 Such suggestions are based on a very simplistic view of science, as if scientists do not disagree and as if there
are no genuine controversies among scientists.
The second phenomenon that brought the discourse concerning science into law was the accusation that during the Bush administration, science
became politicized.24 This kind of discourse also
tends to idealize science and is the reason President
Obama claims that his administration will pay attention to science, not politics,25 as if there is pure
science available if we would just pay attention.
But is it really possible to remove worldviews and
values from the scientific enterprise in the service
of law?
Now, I could at this point construct a debate
and say that on one side are those who trust science
completely, and on the other side are those who
do not trust the scientific establishment, perhaps
because they believe that all science is politically

motivated or perhaps because they fear scientists
as a bunch of Dr. Frankenstein’s with no moral
sensitivity. Then I could say that the Christian or
neo-Calvinist view is somewhere in between. But
the debates over science in law are actually a lot
more nuanced and more interesting than that, and
it is probably better to organize the various narratives concerning science on a continuum—there
are various positions available in the debate, and I’ll
identify five of them.
I will begin with those commentators who
seem to have a near-complete faith in science as
the single source of truth—I mentioned above the
physicist Steven Weinberg, who wrote Facing Up:
Science and Its Cultural Adversaries (2001). That book
is a diatribe against those who view science as a
cultural activity involving values, theoretical biases, and advocacy. We might also think of Michael
Specter’s recent book, titled Denialism: How
Irrational Thinking Hinders Scientific Progress, Harms the
Planet, And Threatens Our Lives (2009). The very title of that book, Denialism, suggests that we should
simply listen to the objective truths that science offers us. Among legal scholars, the parallel to such
a perspective can be found in the work of Michael
Saks, who thinks that the reason there is too much
junk science in the courtroom is that lawyers don’t
take the time to pay attention to scientific truth:
Any attorney, like any intelligent citizen who takes
the time to research a purported scientific subject,
has the potential to reach her own conclusions
about whether or not the field’s beliefs rest on a
foundation of data and logic that is solid, mushy,
or non-existent 26

Anyone can do it. But what Saks ignores, in order
to make such an observation, is that in litigation involving scientific issues, there is often considerable
uncertainty, dispute, and controversy among scientific experts—(1) there may be no scientific consensus against which to measure a legal judgment;
(2) the number of studies may be limited; and (3) it
is commonplace that competent, well-intentioned,
and conscientious scientists utilize identical data
and agree on identical criteria of interpretation,
and then reach different conclusions.27 So it’s not
just core data leading to a conclusion—there’s
more going on.

In the regulatory arena, the parallel with those
who worship science is those who say that risk assessments should be value-free, without normative
foundations. Values, in this view, introduce biases
into an otherwise rational process—the Food &
Drug Administration, for example, should act on
the basis of science alone.28 If we allow ethical, religious, or moral values in the door, then, it is said,
the process becomes politicized and produces junk
science.29 It is said that the inherent uncertainty of
science, unfortunately, can be exploited to derail
the appropriate process of value-free risk assessment.30 Now that view, which finds its way into

Because of the need
for judges and juries
and governmental
administrators to rely on
science, the nature and
reliability of the scientific
enterprise have become
important topics in legal
discourse.
the literature on regulation, sounds naïve and oldfashioned. It idealizes science and promises objective guidance that is, in reality, rarely available.
So let’s move to the next position on the continuum, the more sophisticated view that acknowledges the presence of non-scientific judgments.
When we approve a product on the market because
there is a “reasonable certainty of no harm,” we
mean that the risk is acceptable to our society; this
view is a value judgment based on the best science
available. This perspective concedes that scientists
have interpretive disagreements, that they argue
for plausible alternatives, and that they engage in
vigorous debates. However, this perspective holds
out hope for value-free science because it is only
high levels of scientific uncertainty that raise the
need for value judgments—once we have highPro Rege—March 2011
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quality science, ample evidence, and small margins
of error, the need for value judgments disappears.31
That brings us to the next perspective, even
less idealistic about the stability of science, which
views all risk assessments as judgment calls. Even
a scientist’s degree of confidence is not a scientific matter, and our assessment of whether a scientific analysis is relatively certain is grounded in
pragmatic decisions about what to study, which
variables to consider, how accurate our measurements need to be, and how much potential error
we’re willing to accept. When we say something is
“safe” or “injurious” or we say that the evidence is
“ample” or “convincing” or “reasonably certain,”
those words sound scientific but are actually nonscientific judgments.32
Now this sounds like a really sophisticated
view of the limitations of the scientific enterprise,
but notice that we’re talking about the limitations
of science within the risk-assessment or policymaking context. That is, there is still a strong fact/
value distinction, insofar as science is factual, and
values only come into play as we consider the impact of a substance or technology on society. We
begin with the inevitable scientific disagreements
among technical experts; then we turn to the value
conflicts as to the social and political evaluation of
impacts.
Now we can move to another, more radical,
position on the continuum, even farther away from
the idealized position from which I started. I just
described a seemingly sophisticated vision of the
limits of science, wherein science necessarily involves non-scientific judgments; and it is the technical disagreement among scientists that leads us
or causes us to make value or political judgments.
This makes it sound as if we have one thing, namely
an identifiable uncertainty, in science, and then we
begin to argue about what to do in the face of that
monolithic uncertainty, and we argue for precaution
and about how much risk to take.
We should go back to the scientific enterprise
that produced the thing we’re calling uncertainty.
That enterprise includes contradictory certainties
and plural rationalities: scientific debates gave rise
to the label “uncertainty,” but in most major policy
disputes—think of genetically modified foods, the
danger of low-dose toxicity in plastic bottles, glob6

Pro Rege—March 2011

al warming—we find multiple and contradictory
certainties.33
Moreover, in the activity of risk-assessment and
policy-making, we also have contradictory certainties and plural rationalities. And here’s the point:
these contradictory certainties arise from culture,
from cultural orientations, or worldviews. In all
of the previous positions on the continuum, there
was no talk of culture because in policy discourse,
we only turn to culture as a last resort—we prefer to say there was scientific conflict or political
conflict; but we can instead account for these regulatory conflicts in terms of cultural orientations.34
Some people have a fundamental view of nature
as robust and tolerant, while others see nature as
ephemeral and vulnerable.35 One’s viewpoint is
going to affect everything in debates over low-dose
toxicity, global warming, or genetically modified
foods. To the extent that politically conservative
or religious people are respectively individualistic
and hierarchical, they tend to be skeptical of environmental risks, while those with communitarian and egalitarian worldviews are more sensitive
concerning global warming or nuclear power. But
then, in a curious reversal, when it comes to synthetic biology, the engineering of new biological
organisms, the conservative and religious citizens
get very skeptical, while the egalitarian and communitarian citizens are suddenly less sensitive because synthetic biology can stop diseases and feed
the hungry.36 Those decisions are not made on the
basis of science or risk-assessment techniques but
are made on the basis of worldviews. Each side is
perfectly rational in terms of its convictions about
the world.
Now, this is not simply an argument that
politics infects the regulatory process. I think of
David Michael’s Doubt is Their Product: How Industry’s
Assault on Science Threatens Your Health (2008), which
explains how tobacco and pharmaceutical lobbyists exploit scientific uncertainty and claim that
the science is not certain enough to regulate many
products. That argument is basically that science
is great but that politics gets in the way; it is another
way of idealizing science as determinative. Nor am
I arguing, as anthropologist Paul Rabinow does,
that we need to put ethicists and lawyers and social
scientists in the laboratory so that scientists will be

faced with values and regulation at the outset of
their activities because Rabinow’s argument presumes that science is objective and value-free until
the ethicists arrive.37
Rather, I am arguing for the acknowledgement
of multiple interpretive frames, which reflect values
but which see facts differently.38 People do not say,
“I’m going to take a position or make an argument
that serves my interests.” Instead, people see things
differently and perceive the level and acceptability of the very same risks differently—that’s why
I said we’re not dealing with scientific uncertainty
followed by value judgments; we’re dealing with
contradictory certainties. Our selection of facts
and values is not so much conscious and voluntary
as it is grounded in our cultural assumptions.
In any event, that’s a fairly skeptical view of the
power of science to guide policy decisions, and the
only position left on my continuum is the view that

Every science has a history,
every science operates on
the basis of probabilities,
and every science involves
value-driven communities,
consensus-building, and
limitations in terms of
instrumentation, resources,
and human perception.
scientists are untrustworthy. So, where am I going with this? I’m trying to find a framework that
explains what is going on when law appropriates
science, in the courtroom and in the regulatory
process.
First, as to the courtroom, if we idealize science, and we fail to acknowledge its pragmatic features, we have oversimplified the ability of science
to serve or supplement law with determinative
knowledge. Consequently, we cannot make sense
of what is happening in U.S. courtrooms. We ei-

ther have to say that all scientists are correct because they are scientists; but we know that isn’t true
because scientific experts disagree in court all the
time. Or we have to say that when two scientists
disagree, one of them is a liar, and the other has
the truth; but we know that good scientists have
genuine disagreements, so we need a better picture
of science to explain why scientists disagree. The
answer is to have a more modest view of science
that acknowledges its pragmatic features. Every
science has a history, every science operates on the
basis of probabilities, and every science involves
value-driven communities, consensus-building,
and limitations in terms of instrumentation, resources, and human perception. Furthermore,
science changes—many forensic scientists who
provided evidence for criminal trials, on the basis
of fingerprint or hair or bite-mark identification
techniques, have now been proven wrong by DNA
evidence.39 So should we now glorify DNA as
the final step in our quest for knowledge? I don’t
think so because even DNA analysis involves human beings and probabilities and possible errors—
it’s great stuff but not always a truth machine.40
It is fabulous, but we need to remember that we
thought fingerprint identification was flawless until we started reversing convictions on the basis of
new DNA evidence.
In the regulatory context, I don’t think we want
to explain or account for our current scientific
disputes by saying that the scientists on one side
are liars or that they have been duped by lobbyists or their own political interests. It makes more
sense to identify cultural biases, which shape how
evidence is gathered, interpreted, and reported.
Whenever we have data, there is still room for selecting, minimizing, maximizing, magnifying, and
dramatizing data on the basis of social preferences,
even as we claim to be merely applying scientific
expertise.41 The very perception of risk, or reasonable certainty, is framed by values in order to make
strategic arguments. Some people have a precautionary worldview, and some have a Promethean
worldview, the latter of which implies that we can
technologically solve all our problems and that,
therefore, we need not be so cautious.42 Both sides
use science, so we cannot say, “Let’s just let science
decide who is right.” Long before we leave the
Pro Rege—March 2011
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scientific realm to enter law and politics, we have
conflicting conceptual lenses. The very criteria for
uncertainty, sound science, reliable evidence, and
adequate research are not fixed but vary according
to ideological commitments, social contexts, and
interpretive frames. Therefore, any appeals to science as the final arbiter are oversimplifications.
In conclusion, when we visit courtrooms and
regulatory agencies and we see how science is used,
the debates are hard to explain unless we have a
sense, a neo-Calvinist sensibility, that worldviews
affect everything, even the exact sciences. We love
and enjoy scientific progress and its benefits, but
we do not idealize its potential to answer every
question—science does not give us our purposes,
aims, and priorities, and it comes to us with uncertainties, institutional biases, and even built-in
values as to what was worth investigating, what
could be funded, and what was advocated for and
negotiated in scientific communities. We should
neither worship nor distrust science, but rather we
should recognize its limitations as the stabilizer of
legal and regulatory disputes.
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